Conquests and Rents: A Political Economy of Dictatorship and Violence in Muslim Societies (Political Economy of Institutions and Decisions)

Tragically, dictatorship and civil strife have led to less developed, less democratic, and more conflict-prone contemporary Muslim-majority societies.Ahmed argues, however, neither Islam nor aspects of Muslim culture are the cause.Grounded in a positive political economy approach, Conquests and Rents investigates why these societies are predisposed to political violence and low levels of development.Focusing on the role of political institutions and economic rents, Ahmed argues that territories where Islam spread via military conquest developed institutions and practices impervious to democracy and more prone to civil war, while societies in non-conquered territories developed governance structures more susceptible to democracy when rents decline.Conquests and Rents introduces a novel theoretical argument, with corroborative qualitative and statistical analysis, to examine the interplay of the historical legacy of institutions from the premodern period and contemporary rent streams in